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The aim of this paper is to examine political psychological implications of individualism and 
collectivism among the citizens of thirty OECD countries in the domain of attribution of responsibility, 
utilizing the five waves of World Values Survey data. First, this paper will evaluate the effects of 
individualism and collectivism on the individual’s feeling of freedom and control over his or her life in 
general. It will touch upon the question of agency, which should affect one’s expectation for the role of 
the government among others. Second, it will take a close look into the effects of those cultural values 
and frames on the individual’s opinion about government responsibility in general and her role in 
economy in particular.  
 





How does culture affect the citizens with a different value profile in their sense of agency 
and opinion about the role of the government? To answer this question, this paper attempts to 
analyze political psychological implications of individualism and collectivism in the domain 
of attribution of responsibility.  
Individualism and collectivism have been proposed and studied as one of the most 
important dimensions of cultural differences (Triandis, 1995; Oyserman, Coon, and 
Kemmelmeier, 2002; Oyserman and Uskul, 2008). In addition, there has been a call for 
taking into account the fact that individuals with a different cultural value profile will think 
and act differently, even in the same culture (Yoon, 2010). In this perspective, cultural 
frames at the aggregate level are bipolar and opposite while cultural values at the individual 
level are at least domain specific (Oyserman et al., 2002). In other words, individuals would 
have a different cultural profile that consists of different degrees of individualistic and 
collectivistic values and they would think and act differently according to a situation where 
they find themselves, even in the same cultural context. Still, strong individualistic culture 
implies weak collectivistic culture, and vice versa. 
Having said that, this paper will evaluate the effects of such cultural frames as 
individualism and collectivism on the individuals with a different cultural value profile, who 
would have different political preferences even in the same cultural context. First, it will 
touch upon the question of agency, which should affect one’s expectation for the role of the 
government among others. Second, it will take a close look into the effects of those cultural 
values and frames on the individual’s opinion about government responsibility in general and 
her role in economy in particular.1 
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One of the core concepts in cross-cultural psychological study of the interplay between 
the social environment and psychological functioning is agency that addresses the question 
of “what impels actions.” By logical extension, it addresses the question of who or what is 
responsible for an individual’s action and the answer has been suggested to lie on the 
dimension of personal (i.e., individual self) versus collective (i.e., others or group) agency. 
Menon et al. (1999) elaborated on the dichotomy. They advanced that not only an individual 
but also a collective can possess “the power of an agent to exert the law set forth by its 
internal will rather than that of external constraint,” which is Kantian notion of autonomy. In 
other words, the internal will that motivates an individual’s action could be originated from 
individual self or from collective. 
The concept of agency is closely tied in with “locus of control,” one of the most studied 
concepts of personality attribute in psychology. According to Rotter who pioneered the study 
in the 1960s, an individual’s “generalized expectancies” of the locus of control vary on the 
dimension of internal versus external control. A belief in “internal control” refers to “the 
degree to which persons expect that a reinforcement or an outcome of their behavior is 
contingent on their own behavior or personal characteristics” while “external control” refers 
to “the degree to which persons expect that the reinforcement or outcome is a function of 
chance, luck, or fate, is under the control of powerful others, or is simply unpredictable.” The 
dimension of internal-external locus of control reflects the degree which individuals accept 
personal responsibility for what happens to them (1996, italics added) and thus conceptually 
overlaps significantly with that of personal versus collective agency. 
As many issues in mainstream psychology that presuppose universality, however, the 
question of agency has preferred one particular answer, that is, personal agency. 
Psychologists have argued that “internal states, motives, and dispositions inside disjoint 
individuals” impel and hence, are responsible for, their actions. Indeed, there had not existed 
the notion of the dichotomy of personal versus collective agency in Western psychology. Yet 
as psychologists began to incorporate the concept of culture in the field of study, they 
realized that there exist other forms of agency, where actions are impelled by external forces 
that include “others, in relationship and interaction with others” (Markus and Kitayama, 
1991). Thus, psychologists now conceptualize human agency in terms of personal versus 
collective or group agency, personal referring to the former, Western conception while 
collective or group to the latter, Eastern conception. In other words, they now consider others 
or collective as another unit of agency (Lehman, Chiu, and Schaller, 2004; Bandura, 2006). 
The origin of the different approaches to agency in the context of different cultural 
environments can be explained by Nisbett and his colleagues’ sociocognitive system theory 
(Nisbett et al., 2001; Nisbett, 2003). According to the theory, social differences among 
different social environments or cultures affect not only individuals’ beliefs about specific 
aspects of the world but also “system of thought” that consists of metaphysics (i.e., beliefs of 
the nature of the world and causality), epistemology (i.e., beliefs about what is important to 
know and how knowledge can be obtained), and cognitive and perceptual habits. Historically, 
the social differences can be traced and classified into two major social organizations or 
cultures, one that emphasizes a sense of personal agency and the other a sense of collective 
agency or one with less and the other with more social relations and role constraints. Thus, 
people tend to regard themselves as free agents or as constrained by and as less agentic than, 




social collective, depending on the type of cultures in which they were raised and live. 
Theoretically, the concepts closely related to personal agency have frequently been 
suggested as one of the core attributes of individualism. For example, according to Lukes 
(1973, Chapter 8), autonomy or self-direction, one of the “basic ideas” of individualism, is 
the notion that an individual’s thought and action is his own, and not determined by causes 
outside his control. He elaborated on the term by contrasting it with what seems to constitute 
the notion of collective agency.  
 
An individual is autonomous (at the social level) to the degree to which he subjects the 
pressures and norms with which he is confronted to conscious and critical evaluation, and form 
intentions and reaches practical decisions as the result of independent and rational reflection 
(Lukes, 1973: 52). 
 
Hofstede (1980) explained that emphasis on personal autonomy and initiative 
characterized “high individualism.” Waterman (1984) suggested Rotter’s internal locus of 
control as one of the four personality qualities that individualism embodies.2 One can also 
find the conceptual affinity of personal agency with Schwartz’ self-direction at the individual 
level (1990) and autonomy at the aggregate level (2004).  
As opposed to the concept of personal agency, collective agency, as a relative newcomer 
to Western psychology, has not been extensively discussed as related to the attributes of 
collectivism except for contrasting purposes (e.g., Lukes, 1973; Menon et al., 1999; 
Schwartz, 1994, 2004). However, one can relate, without much difficulty, the notion of 
collective agency with relationship and group-centered elements of collectivism. In fact, 
cultural psychologists have attempted to demonstrate empirically that individualistic culture 
encourages personal agency while collectivistic culture collective agency (Menon et al., 1999; 
Choi, Nisbett, and Norenzayan, 1999; Choi et al., 2003). 
In sum, the question of agency deals with an individual’s global, enduring beliefs or 
“generalized expectancies” to use Rotter’s term, about who or what motivates and thus is 
responsible for, his or her actions in general. Individualism and collectivism have been 
suggested to influence an individual’s beliefs in individual and collective agency, 
respectively, both theoretically and empirically. That being the case, it is reasonable to 
assume that those cultural, cross-situational beliefs about “who or what have control over life 
affairs” would influence attribution of responsibility, which is specific behavior. In politics, 
the relevant actors for the question of agency are the individual and the government, the pair 
of which is the focus in the analysis of attribution of responsibility. 
 
1.2 Attribution of Responsibility 
 
In psychology, how individuals assign responsibility for behaviors and events has often 
been studied in the context of attribution theory especially since Heider led the way in the 
late 1950s. According to social and political psychologists, attribution theory aspires to 
provide a systematic account of how ordinary people make sense of and explain social events. 
In other words, it attempts to explain how lay people understand causally or more 
                                                           
2  The other personality qualities include Eriksonian sense of personal identity, Maslow’s self-
actualization, and Kohlberg’s principled (post-conventional) moral reasoning (Waterman, 1984: 
Chapter 3). 
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specifically assign causes and effects to the world around them including themselves 
(Fincham and Jaspars, 1980; Kinder and Fiske, 1986; McGraw, 2001). This attribution 
process implicates responsibility attribution as the latter process also involves causality 
assignment or “imputation” as one of the “two facets” of responsibility. “Answerability,” 
which has been regarded as a synonym of responsibility, is the second facet and they have 
been theoretically distinguished in contemporary philosophy as well as in psychology. It 
focuses on “the liability for appropriate sanctions” (Schlenker, 1994) or accountability 
(Fincham and Jaspars, 1980). 
Attribution theorists have sustained that Heider’s claim that the most important 
distinction made by observers in their explanations of social acts is between internal cause – 
the traits, abilities, intentions, and so on, of the actor – and external causes – the incentives, 
pressures, demands, and so on, of the situation (Kinder and Fiske, 1986). Thus, they have 
examined the degree to which and the conditions under which people rely on internal, 
dispositional or external, situational attribution.  
The dichotomy of internal versus external casual attribution is also relevant to the 
dichotomy of agency, internal versus collective agency. Culture oriented psychologists have 
suggested that individualism and collectivism would encourage a particular form of agency 
would favor one way of causal attribution over the other. Indeed, they have advanced that 
individualism that encourages personal agency facilitates internal or dispositional attribution 
while collectivism that encourages collective agency facilitates external or contextual 
attribution. For example, Miller (1984), who first demonstrated the importance of culture in 
casual attribution, claimed that different “cultural meaning systems” would affect an 
individual’s development of everyday social explanation in the direction of dispositional or 
contextual emphasis, independent of his or her cognitive capacities and objective experiential 
conditions, both of which have been previously suggested as factors explaining cross-cultural 
attributional diversity. The author’s evidence suggests that contrasting cultural conceptions 
of the person, i.e., individualistic or holistic, entail these cross-cultural and developmental 
differences in social attribution. Morris and Peng (1994) showed that dispositional attribution 
for behavior was more widespread in individualistic culture of the United States than in 
collectivistic culture of China. According to these authors, the person-centered theory that 
social behavior reveals stable, global, internal dispositions is more prevalent in Judeo-
Christian individualistic cultures while the situation-centered theory” that social behavior is 
shaped by relationships, roles, and situational pressures is dominant in Confucian 
collectivistic cultures. Triandis (1995) also observed that individualists attribute events to 
internal individual causes more frequently than collectivists, who tend to attribute them to 
external causes probably because their perceptions and cognition are influenced by different 
cultural syndromes. Furthermore, as discussed above, Menon and her colleagues (1999) 
explicitly framed the issue of cultural differences in attribution as the question of agency. 
The authors proposed that cross-cultural, attributional divergences would arise from 
contrasting “implicit theories” or conceptions of which actors in society have agency, i.e., 
individual or collective, which they also traced to individualistic, Judeo-Christian tradition in 
the West and collectivistic, Confucian tradition in the East. 
Recent studies have shown more nuanced cultural differences in attribution. According to 
extensive ethnographic and psychological data analysis by Choi et al. (1999), for example, 
internal attribution is a cross-culturally widespread mode of thinking. Yet they showed that 
East Asians, who represent collectivism, made more external attribution than their 
counterpart, Americans, who represent individualism. Choi and his colleagues (2003) 




confirmed the finding. 
 
1.3 Attribution of Responsibility in Political Science 
 
Political scientists in general as well as political psychologists have studied the attribution 
of responsibility extensively as the subject is particularly relevant to democracy, where 
citizens can hold their representatives accountable for their performances usually by electoral 
choices and not infrequently by public opinions. The significance of citizens’ responsibility 
attribution for political issues is well supported by the empirical studies of voting and public 
opinion (McGraw, 2001). Rudolph (2003: 700) even claimed that the concept of 
responsibility lied “at the heart of theories of democratic accountability.”  
The majority of the political science literature on the subject has analyzed citizens’ 
attributions of responsibility for broadly defined political and social problems, such as 
economic conditions, crime, terrorism, and racial inequality. In fact, we have learned a great 
deal about the political consequences of responsibility attributions – i.e., “throw the rascals 
out” – most likely based on citizens’ retrospective, sociotropic voting behavior (Kinder and 
Kiewiet, 1979, 1981; Feldman, 1984; Lewis-Beck and Stegmaier, 2000). Yet, we have only 
limited knowledge about the factors that influence the formation of responsibility attribution 
in politics (Gibson and Gouws, 1999; McGraw, 2001; Rudolph, 2003). In a sense, political 
scientists have focused on the second facet of responsibility, accountability, rather than the 
first one, causal imputation, which is logically antecedent to accountability. 
This paper proposes individualism and collectivism as cultural frames at the aggregate 
level and cultural values at the individual level should be considered as one of the important 
determinants of the individual’s attribution of responsibility. In this paper, I will first 
examine the effects of individualism and collectivism on the question of agency in general, 
that is, without reference to the government. This will be the groundwork for the subsequent 
analyses of what factors influence who should be in charge of various policy issues. In 
addition, I will investigate the effects of individualism and collections on individual’s 
political attitudes that would be formed via responsibility attributions. 
 
 




The analysis focuses on (1) the statistical significance of slope and intercept variance 
estimates and (2) the effects of individualism and collectivism on agency and responsibility 
attribution variables while distinguishing their individual level effects as cultural values from 
the cultural level effects as cultural frames. 
First, I hypothesize that slope and intercept variance estimates are statistically significant 
for all the models. In other words, I expect that across countries there exist differential 
effects of individualism and collectivism as the individual level cultural values. In addition, I 
expect that the mean of each dependent variable when all the independent variables are set to 
their means – 0 in this case because of grand mean centering – is different across countries. 
That is, I hypothesize that the variance estimates for the intercepts are statistically significant. 
Substantively, this hypothesis is about whether each country is a legitimate unit for cultural 
analysis as well as for multilevel modeling analysis in a sense that it has the different effects 
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of cultural values and a different baseline value for each dependent variable 
Second, the effects of individualism both at the cultural level and at the individual level 
on “Freedom of Choice and Control” and “Fate vs. Control,” are hypothesized to be positive 
while the effects of collectivism on those agency variables negative. In other words, 
individualism and collectivism exert opposite influences along these dimensions of the 
agency variables. 
As discussed above, individualism values personal agency and responsibility. It 
encourages people who live in individualistic culture or who are individualists to exercise 
control over their own action. Personal agency has been also associated with such values as 
autonomy and self-direction that emphasize independent thought and action, not swayed by 
external causes outside of one’s control. On the contrary, collectivism values belongingness, 
relationship, context, duty, group, hierarchy, and harmony, among others, (Oyserman et al., 
2002) that promote external control and group or collective agency. Thus, it encourages 
people who live in collectivistic culture or who are collectivists to allow others or context to 
influence on themselves or their actions. 
Third, I hypothesize that the effects of individualism and collectivism on attribution of 
responsibility variables are also bipolar opposite. In other words, I expect individualism 
exerts positive effect on personal responsibility while collectivism on government respon-
sibility when it comes to the basic personal welfare question. In addition, individualism is 
hypothesized to facilitate support for private ownership of business and industry and income 
difference as incentives for individual effort while collectivism support for government 
ownership and income redistribution. 
The expectation is consistent with the hypothesis proposed on the agency questions. 
Individualism that values personal agency or internal control should encourage the value of 
self-reliance when it comes to the basic personal welfare. By logical extension, individualism 
is expected to encourage the idea of “limited government” while collectivism to advocate or 
at least acknowledge the expanded role of modern government in macro-economic 
management. In fact, self-reliance, defined as “the idea that individuals should take care of 
their own well-being, particularly (but not only) their economic condition,” and limited 
government, defined as the belief that “the purpose of government is strictly to protect life, 
liberty, and property, and thereby provide a framework within which individuals may pursue 
their private interests” have been proposed as distinct aspects of American individualism, 
along with autonomy discussed above (Markus, 2001: 407). It is reasonable to assume that 
these aspects are relevant to individualism in general since the United States has been 
suggested to represent a prototypical individualist culture. For example, Hofstede (2001) 
rated her individualism (IDV) as 91 out of 100 and the most individualistic country out of 
fifty three nations and regions he evaluated. The country level measure of individualism by 
Suh et al. (1998) that this analysis draws on also rated her 9.55 out of 10 and the most 
individualistic country out of sixty nations they evaluated. 
In addition, drawing on the empirical evidence supporting the hypothesis of “clarity of 
responsibility” that people tend to do better in attributional tasks when the cue of who is 
responsible is clear (Powell and Whitten, 1993; Anderson, 1995, 2000), I expect still 
opposite but smaller effect of those cultural frames and values on responsibility attribution 
when the question of who is in charge is not explicitly invoked but implied. 3  Thus, I 
                                                           
3 Feldman (1984) made an even stronger case for the cultural effect on attribution of responsibility 
while denying the influence or clarity of government responsibility suggested by Kramer (1971 and 




hypothesize that collectivism would exert positive effect while individualism negative effect, 
on income redistribution but their effects are weaker than in cases above where the 
government is explicitly invoked in the questions. 
Lastly, I theorize the direction and statistical significance of cultural values at the 
individual level and cultural frames at the country level are aligned. In other words, the 
positive effect of individualism as a cultural value at the individual level (IND) on personal 
agency will be accompanied with positive effect of individualism as a cultural frame at the 
country level (IC). In other words, individualistic people who live in individualistic culture 
are expected to value personal agency most. In addition, I expect significant cross-level 
effects of the aligned cultural values and dominant cultural frames. That is, there would be 
synergistic, mutually reinforcing cultural effects from the individual and cultural level. For 
example, I hypothesize that a collectivist in collectivist culture would support government 
ownership of business and industry more than the sum of the coefficients of each cultural 
variable because of the additional cross-level effect. 
 
2.2 Empirical Models 
 
To empirically identify political cultural effects of individualism and collectivism on 
agency and attribution of responsibility, I ran four multilevel models that estimate the effects 
at the individual level and at the country level, with or without cross-level interaction and 
with or without the second macro-level variable, government size. Thus, there are four 
multilevel models to be estimated for each dependent variable. 
The other parameter estimates of interest are variance components, the statistical 
significance of which is used to test the assumption that there exists differential contextual 
effect. The estimation of the multilevel models is based on the independently pooled cross-
sectional data of 30 OECD member countries over the five waves (1981-2007) of the World 
Values Survey. 
All the independent variables including the dichotomous ones are grand mean centered to 




Level 1: Individual 
Attributional Variables 
= B0 + B1 Employment Status + B2 Income + B3 Education + B4 Gender  
+ B5 L-R Ideology + B6 Individualism or Collectivism + rij 
 
Level 2: Country 
B0 = G00 + G01 Individualism Culture + u0j 




                                                           
1983). According to the author, personal attribution is strongly related to people’s belief in economic 
individualism that consists of the work ethic and equality of opportunity, not a matter of their failing 
to see government responsibility. Attribution of changing personal well-being to the wider societal 
context is only common among those who do not subscribe to both of these cultural beliefs. 
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= G00 + B1 Employment Status + B2 Income + B3 Education + B4 Gender  
+ B5 L-R Ideology + G10 Individualism or Collectivism  
+ G01 Individualism Culture + u1j Individualism or Collectivism + rij + u0j 
 
Model 2 
Level 1: Individual 
Attributional Variables 
= B0 + B1 Employment Status + B2 Income + B3 Education + B4 Gender  
+ B5 L-R Ideology + B6 Individualism or Collectivism + rij 
 
Level 2: Country 
B0 = G00 + G01 Individualism Culture + G02 Government Size + u0j 




= G00 + B1 Employment Status + B2 Income + B3 Education + B4 Gender  
+ B5 L-R Ideology + G10 Individualism or Collectivism + G02 Government Size 
+ G01 Individualism Culture + u1j Individualism or Collectivism + rij + u0j 
 
Model 3 
Level 1: Individual 
Attributional Variables 
Components of Civic Culture/Social Capital or Political Interest/Participation 
= B0 + B1 Employment Status + B2 Income + B3 Education + B4 Gender  
+ B5 L-R Ideology + B6 Individualism or Collectivism + rij 
 
Level 2: Country 
B0 = G00 + G01 Individualism Culture + u0j 




= G00 + B1 Employment Status + B2 Income + B3 Education + B4 Gender  
+ B5 L-R Ideology + G10 Individualism or Collectivism  
+ G01 Individualism Culture  
+ G12 Individualism or Collectivism*Individualism Culture  
+ u1j Individualism or Collectivism + rij + u0j 
 
Model 4 
Level 1: Individual 
Attributional Variables 
= B0 + B1 Employment Status + B2 Income + B3 Education + B4 Gender  
+ B5 L-R Ideology + B6 Individualism or Collectivism + rij 
Level 2: Country 
B0 = G00 + G01 Individualism Culture + G02 Government Size + u0j 
B6 = G10 + G11 Individualism Culture + u1j 







= G00 + B1 Employment Status + B2 Income + B3 Education + B4 Gender  
+ B5 L-R Ideology + G10 Individualism or Collectivism  
+ G01 Individualism Culture + G02 Government Size 
+ G12 Individualism or Collectivism*Individualism Culture  
+ u1j Individualism or Collectivism + rij + u0j 
 
A mixed model is a collapsed form of level 1 and level 2 models. B represents the fixed 
effect at the individual level except for the intercept (B0) and the slope of cultural values (B6), 
both of which are random, that is, vary over countries. Gst is the effect of the macro variable t 
(i.e., macro-level intercept, Individualism Culture, and Government Size) on the regression 
coefficient of micro variable s (i.e., micro-level intercept and Individualism or Culturalism 
index). It represents the fixed effect at the country level. r refers to level 1 error and u level 2 
error. The subscript i indexes respondent and j country.  
The analysis used STATA software and the restricted maximum likelihood (REML) 





The results seem to support that culture matters. In general, the cultural effects of 
individualism and collectivism showed up at least at one level – either the individual or the 
cultural level – except for income redistribution. First, as illustrated from the variance 
component estimation parts of Table 1 – Table 10, all the variance with the sole exception of 
the slope variance of individualism for “Fate versus Control” are statistically significant, 
which suggests that there exists contextual effect in general. All the estimates except for the 
slope variances of that dependent variable are at least two times larger than their standard 
error.4 Thus, it is highly likely that each country has different slopes or different effects of 
individualism and collectivism at the individual level in the domain of agency and 
government responsibility. In addition, considering that variance of intercept estimates are 
statistically significant, it is also highly likely that each country has a different mean for each 
dependent variable when other independent and control variables are set to zero, that is, their 
respective grand means. This should strengthen the case that each country is a legitimate unit 
of analysis in the study of culture as well as in multilevel modeling analysis. 
For the agency questions, individualism both at the individual level (IND) and at the 
cultural level (IC) confirms the hypothesized positive effects on the “Freedom of Choice and 
Control.” In other words, individualists are more likely to “feel they have completely free 
choice and control over their lives” and individualistic culture adds a positive effect. In 
addition, the positive effects of IND and IC on the first agency variable strengthen the case 
that it is an intervening variable between culture and subjective well-being. 
As Table 1 shows, cultural effects seem stronger at the national level considering 5-point 
scale of IND as opposed to 10-point scale of IC. The size of coefficients range from 0.11 to 
                                                           
4 All the four slope variances of individualism at the cultural level for “Fate vs. Control” are about the 
same as their respective standard errors. See Table 3. 
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0.13 for IC and are close to 0.12 for IND. It is also interesting to note that Left-Right self-
placement is also positive (0.3 to 0.4) and statistically significant.  
According to Table 3, individualistic cultural value also leads people more likely to 
believe “people shape their fate themselves” although the cultural level effects on the same 
“Fate versus Control” variable are not statistically significant regardless of controlling for 
government size and cross-level effect. The individual level effects of IND in fact seem to be 
larger, ranging from 0.16 to 0.18, than those in “Freedom of Choice and Control.”  
By contrast, collectivism does not show consistent effects across levels on the agency 
variables. For example, Table 2 shows that collectivistic culture (CI) discourages the feeling 
of free choice and control over life as expected but collectivistic value at the individual level 
(COL) does not. The individual level effects of COL are all statistically insignificant. In 
addition, collectivists are more likely to believe “everything in life is determined by fate” 
although collectivistic cultural frame does not appear to lead to the same belief. As shown in 
Table 4, all the coefficients for collectivism as a cultural frame are negative – meaning CI 
affects negatively the belief that ““people shape their fate themselves” – as hypothesized but 
they all are highly statistically insignificant. The p-values are at least greater than .5. 
For the attribution of responsibility variables, individualism and collectivism both at the 
individual level and at the cultural level demonstrate statistically significant effects as 
hypothesized when it comes to “Government versus Individual Responsibility.” That is, 
individualism tends to encourage the belief that “people should take more responsibility to 
provide for themselves” while collectivism the belief that “the government should take more 
responsibility to ensure that everyone is provided for.” Table 5 shows that the sizes of the 
effect of IND and COL are similar in absolute values, the former being close to 0.06 and the 
latter to 0.09. As shown in Table 5 and 6, the cultural level effects are the same in absolute 
values (0.33) and far greater than individual level effects. In addition, it is worthy of note that 
Left-Right self-placement is highly statistically significant and positive, 0.18 in both IND 
and COL models. Both cultural values and ideology have independent effects on citizens’ 
attitude toward government responsibility in the domain of basic personal welfare. 
Collectivism at both levels also leads to the belief that “government ownership of 
business and industry should be increased” especially when the size of the government is 
controlled. Table 8 shows that the coefficients for COL are -0.04 (p-value = 0.03) for Model 
2 and -0.05 (p-value = 0.02) for Model 4, meaning that collectivists are more likely to oppose 
private ownership. The coefficients for CI are all highly significant and negative, ranging 
from -0.17 to -0.20, smaller than those of “Government versus Individual Responsibility” but 
are still considered large. 
In contrast to the collectivism effects, the effect of individualism on the same dependent 
variable is mixed. It seems that individualism leads to the belief that “private ownership of 
business and industry should be increased” only at the cultural level. As shown in Table 7, 
the size of the coefficients, ranging from 0.19 to 0.21 is comparable to those of collectivism 
as cultural frames, which implies that it has equally powerful effect on the ownership 
preference. However, the effects of IND are not statistically significant.  
As in “Government versus Individual Responsibility,” Left-Right also seems to exert 
considerable effects in all the models for the ownership preference. The effects are highly 
statistically significant and close to 0.17 both for individualism and collectivism, almost 
equivalent in size to those of cultural frames. They are all measured on a 10-point scale. 






 KWANG-IL YOON  50 
 




 KWANG-IL YOON  52 
 
  




 KWANG-IL YOON  54 
 




 KWANG-IL YOON  56 
 




 KWANG-IL YOON  58 
 
  




For “Income Redistribution,” the last responsibility attribution variable, none of the 
hypotheses about the effects of individualism and collectivism were confirmed. Although the 
effects of both individualism and collectivism at the individual level are in the expected 
direction, that is, the former being against and the latter for income redistribution, their p-
values are rather large as Table 9 and 10 illustrate. The p-value is 0.14 for individualism in 
Model 4 and the p-value is 0.13 for collectivism in Model 1 and 3.  
As with the case of the ownership question for individualism, this may have to do with 
the fact that the effects of ideology, all of which are highly statistically significant and large, 
eclipse the cultural effect. The right are clearly against income redistribution and favor larger 
income differences as individual incentives. The sizes of the ideology effect are close to -
0.24, larger than any other coefficients. Moreover, the absence of clear information about 
who or what is responsible for this policy may weaken the effects of individualism and 
collectivism, which exist in the other two responsibility attribution questions that involve 
“government.” In a sense, the results seem consistent with the clarity of responsibility 
hypothesis. 
Lastly, despite grand mean centering, none of the cross-level interactions are statistically 
significant, which suggests that the current data do not support the hypothesis that cultural 
frame and values have synergistic effects. This may have to with the fact that the inferential 





The empirical analysis attempts to show that individualism and collectivism as cultural 
frames as well as cultural values matter when it comes to individuals’ attitude toward agency 
in general and political preference toward the issue related to individual versus government 
responsibility. A series of multilevel modeling that the analysis draws on to distinguish 
individual and aggregate level of the cultural effects seems to confirm that this is the case in 
general. The statistically significant independent effects of individualism and collectivism 
show up as hypothesized either at one level of analysis or at both. 
In addition, the analysis shows that individualism and collectivism register independent 
effects as cultural values or as cultural frames, in the areas – i.e., government responsibility 
in basic personal welfare, ownership of business and industry, and income redistribution – 
where the left-right ideology has been suggested especially powerful. For “Government 
versus Individual Responsibility” in particular, individualism and collectivism at both levels 
as well as the ideological self-placement have significant effects on the individual’s 
attribution preference as hypothesized. An individualist in individualistic cultures who 
identifies with the ideology of the right is most likely to believe that “people should take 
more responsibility to provide for themselves.” In addition, for the ownership variable, 
collectivism at both levels as well as the ideology has independent effects on the individual’s 
preference as theorized. For example, a collectivist in collectivistic cultures who identifies 
with the left ideology is most likely to prefer government ownership of business and industry. 
This alignment of the effects of culture and political ideology – i.e., individualism with 
the right and collectivism with the left – suggests a new area in cross-cultural psychological 
study where both theoretical and empirical relationship between these two constructs should 
be examined. As the results of this analysis in this paper show, the alignment is noticeable 
when it comes to economic policy preference. Yet there seem to exist other political 
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attitudinal objects where the effects of culture and ideology overlap but are underexplored. 
For example, personal agency has been positively associated with autonomy and self-
reliance aspects of individualism, both of which are also consistent with the ideology of the 
right. According to the Kim and Fording (1998), negative attitude against “social services 
expansion” belong to the Rightist categories. In fact, the analysis shows that the effects of 
individualism at both levels and the ideology of the right on the “Freedom of Choice and 
Control,” an abstract agency variable, are in the same, positive direction while the effects of 
collectivism at the cultural level and the ideology of the left on the same variable are in the 
same, negative direction. 
There also exists the result that needs further elaboration. The fact that individualism and 
collectivism as cultural frames do not affect “Fate versus Control” as theorized appears to 
have to do with the question wordings loaded with religious connotation as opposed to the 
other agency variable, “Freedom of Choice and Control.” For example, the leading sentence 
of the item read as “some people believe that individuals can decide their own destiny, while 
others think that it is impossible to escape a predetermined fate.” Thus, at the individual level 
it could sufficiently invoke the question of agency but at the cultural level the relationship 
might vanish because individualism and collectivism at the national level is not dominated 
by religious component. Furthermore, when the similar concept is framed in a way that 
emphasizes individual level values, it might depress the corresponding cultural level effects 
if there is any. Indeed, the coefficients of individualism and collectivism at the individual 








All the five waves of the World Values Survey have the same question that asks “how 
much freedom of choice and control you feel you have over the way your life turns out” on a 
scale of 1 (“no choice at all”) to 10 (“a great deal of choice”). This item is used to construct 
“Freedom of Choice and Control,” the first dependent variable for the agency question. As 
discussed above, personal versus collective agency has been conceptualized as binary 
opposite as internal versus external locus of control. Thus, the higher the score for this 
variable is, the more personal agency a respondent feels to have. 
The fifth wave (2005–2007) also has a similar question of agency. It asks to what degree 
a respondent’s view come closer to either “everything in life is determined by fate” or 
“people shape their fate themselves” on a 10-point scale. It is used to make “Fate versus 
Control,” the second dependent variable for the agency question.5 Similarly as in “Freedom 
of Choice and Control,” the higher the score for this variable is, the more personal agency a 
respondent believes to have.  
Government versus Individual Responsibility 
Since the second wave (1989–1993), the World Values Survey has had a battery of items 
that tap citizens’ attitudes in economic self-reliance issues. In the first part of attribution of 
responsibility analysis, three items that measure an individual’s preference for government 
                                                           
5 According to Rotter (1996), fate is one of the external controls along with chance, luck, and others. 




responsibility in the domain of basic personal welfare, ownership, and income redistribution 
are selected. 
The first dependent variable for responsibility attribution is “Government versus 
Individual Responsibility.” It is constructed based on the question that asks whether citizens 
agree with the statement “the government should take more responsibility to ensure that 
everyone is provided for” or “people should take more responsibility to provide for 
themselves” on a 10-point scale. The higher the score is, the more a respondent agrees with 
individual responsibility for the basic personal welfare. In contrast with the agency questions, 
the item directly invokes who or what is responsible for sustenance – i.e., the government or 
the individual.  
Government versus Private Ownership of Business and Industry 
The second dependent variable for attribution of responsibility is more specific in terms 
of the area the government is responsible for, ownership of business and industry. 
“Government versus Private Ownership of Business and Industry” is constructed based on 
the item that asks respondents whether their views are close to “private ownership of 
business and industry should be increased” or “government ownership of business and 
industry should be increased” on a 10-point scale. The more a respondent prefers private 
ownership, the higher score he or she will mark.  
Income Redistribution 
The third dependent variable for attribution of responsibility is also about specific 
economic policy. Respondents are asked to reveal their preference on the issue of income 
redistribution – “we need larger income differences as incentives for individual effort” or 
“incomes should be made more equal” – again on a 10-point scale. The question is used to 
make the variable “Income Redistribution.” The higher score means a respondent’s view 
prefers income equality rather than more incentives for individual effort. Although this 
variable is not as explicit as the ownership variable in terms of who is in charge of this policy, 
it is included in the analysis of government responsibility because one can reasonably infer 




Level 1: Individual Level 
Individualism 
This is an additive measure that consists of four individualistic cultural values: 
independence, feeling of responsibility, imagination, and determination and perseverance. It 
ranges from 0 (least individualistic) to 4 (most individualistic). 
Collectivism 
This is an additive measure that consists of four collectivistic cultural values: tolerance 
and respect for other people, religious faith, unselfishness, and obedience. It ranges from 0 
(least collectivistic) to 4 (most collectivistic). 
Left-Right 
This is a 10-category measure for ideological self-identification, 1 being left and 10 being 
right. This variable is included in all the models except for “Fate versus Control,” for which 
ideology does not seem to be relevant.6 
 
                                                           
6 In fact, the ideology variable was not statistically significant when included in “Fate versus Control.” 
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Employed 
This is a dichotomous variable that collapse full time (thirty hours a week or more), part 
time (less than thirty hours a week), and self-employed into “employed” category while 
retired/pensioned, housewife not otherwise employed, student, and unemployed into 
“unemployed.” 
Income 
Income is measured on a 10-point scale, where 1 indicates the lowest income decile and 
10 the highest income decile. It measures household income that includes all wages, salaries, 
pensions and other incomes that come in. 
Education 
Education is a 10 category variable that classifies the groups a respondent belongs to 
based on the age when he or she completed education.7  
Gender 
This is a binary variable that classifies the gender of a respondent. 
 
Level 2: Country Level 
Individualism-Collectivism Ratings at the Country Level (IND-COL) 
This analysis utilizes an independent measure of individualism and collectivism at the 
country level instead of using the country means of those cultural values at the individual 
level in order to avoid the problem of serious multicollinearity. It relies primarily on the 
measure by Suh and his colleagues (1998). They averaged the country level measures by the 
two leading experts on the cultural frames, Hofstede (1980) and Triandis (1990). As opposed 
to the corresponding individual level values, this country level variable is considered 
unidimensional. In other words, the higher the rating of IND-COL, the higher individualistic 
culture a country has. 
Government size 
Government size is measured by government share of real gross domestic product per 
capita in % in 2000 Laspeyres constant prices (Penn World Table 6.2). 8  This is an 
institutional proxy variable that is assumed to represent the degree of collectivism at the 
macro-level. East Germany is the only country that does not have the measure and is not 
included in the multilevel analysis. 
Cross-level Interaction 
There is one cross-level interaction variable in the analysis: individualism or collectivism 
at the individual level (level 1) multiplied by individualism-collectivism at the country level 
(level 2). The cross-level interaction variable is included in the models to determine whether 
cultural effects interact to amplify or dampen corresponding cultural values at the individual 
level beyond the sum of the effects from both levels. 
 




                                                           
7 The variable is missing for New Zealand, making the maximum number of level 2 observations thirty 
in the multilevel models. 
8 East Germany is the only country that does not have the measure and is excluded in Model 2 and 
Model 4 in the multilevel analyses. 
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